

**Presidents, Positions, and Racial Inclusion:
Coalition-Management from
Rutherford B. Hayes to George W. Bush**

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1. Introduction

While a large literature exists on presidential position-taking and agenda-setting in general,¹ previous scholarship has largely ignored position-taking on racial inclusion.² This is unfortunate, given the importance of race in shaping critical elements of presidential politics. For example, V.O. Key argued that the causes and effects of politics in the South – a vital region in electoral politics – can best be explained and traced to race.³ Earle and Merle Black reemphasized this point by claiming that the pivotal event in modern presidential politics has been the emergence of a solidly Republican South, a development they argue is largely tied to race relations.⁴ In a related sense, Edward Carmines and John Stimson argued that racial policies and attitudes are the critical dimensions underlying the coalitions of the political parties,⁵ which has implications for presidential coalition-building activities. These studies reveal an important link between race and presidential politics. They also call for new theories of presidential leadership on racial inclusion that can give social scientists a more comprehensive understanding of the political incentives presidents face; the evolution of and changes in party coalitions; the nature of racial policy processes and outcomes; and how race has routinely affected the American political landscape.

I propose to examine presidential position-taking on African-American racial inclusion from Rutherford B. Hayes to George W. Bush. I ask: *Why do presidents adopt the positions they do on racial inclusion?* The argument is that position-taking on racial inclusion is directly tied to the imperatives of *coalition-management*. As coalition managers, presidents give added weight to groups and interests whose allegiance they perceive as necessary to secure their individual goals.

Implicit in my argument is the belief that the president is a vital actor in the struggle for racial inclusion. Garth Pauley argues that since the time of Lincoln, blacks have looked to the White House for redress of their grievances.⁶ James MacGregor Burns calls the presidency “the most effective single protector of individual liberty in our governmental system.”⁷ Richard Longaker notes in the modern era, the president has been forced to deal with racial inclusion because of the Cold War context and the increased political power of minorities.⁸ Yet, despite these expectations of the president’s role in racial inclusion, I must acknowledge that his ability to develop and communicate positions on race is constrained in at least two ways.

First, the president is embedded in a system of diverse institutions that share, separate, and disperse power. The competing interests that make up this system constrain presidential leadership in most policy areas, including race-related ones. This is not to say, however, that the president is powerless. Political and bureaucratic developments within the executive branch since the Theodore Roosevelt administration endowed presidents with strategic resources for independent action in agenda-setting and policymaking.⁹

Second, the presidency is fraught with an institutional paradox that is at the core of Gunnar Myrdal's "American dilemma" – the dissonance between an American creed of equality and customs of inequality.¹⁰ On the one hand, the executive should promote equality and justice, but he is also politically incapable of extending these core American values because of constitutional design. Article II defines an election process that offers barriers and disincentives for promoting and extending the values the office was designed to protect, particularly to marginalized groups. The reason is that the president is chosen by electors appointed by the states. In this electoral context, a set of biases is injected into the system that work to the advantage of some states and certain groups over others in the competition for candidate attention. In particular, the Electoral College distorts majoritarian politics by contributing to minority vote dilution. Matthew Hoffman argues that since the states appoint presidential electors through a "winner-take-all" process and voting is highly polarized along racial lines, minority voters are generally prevented from choosing electors.¹¹ Furthermore, because victory in many states requires a majority of white voters – who have been historically unwilling to redress racial inequalities by policies¹² – a rational candidate has incentives to ignore controversial and divisive issues that might upset existing racial hierarchies.¹³

1.1 Literature Review

Remarkably, the presidency literature does not offer a comprehensive theory to explain presidential position-taking on racial inclusion. However, a number of related literatures offer insight. I discuss four extant fields here.

The first and most important literature exemplifies a coalition-management approach, despite their primary concentration on political institutions other than the presidency.¹⁴ These studies use a party-centered approach to understand party position-taking on issues relevant for African-Americans, women, and American state development. The authors contend that party positions are closely linked to the activities associated with building and maintaining national coalitions. To be sure, each work attends to some aspects of the presidency, but their unit of analysis is the political party. Therefore, in the best scholarly tradition, I will apply coalition-management to a different unit of analysis – the presidency – in order to test and confirm its theoretical utility.

A second literature involves case studies of individual presidents and how they dealt with racial inclusion.¹⁵ While useful, these works have shortcomings. Most important, case studies limit our ability to generate general conclusions, as Bruce Miroff acknowledges in his seminal work on the relationship of the Johnson administration to the civil rights movement. He writes, “A single case study cannot produce definitive generalizations. Its findings must be tested in analogous cases before generalized relationships can be confidently asserted.”¹⁶ I will fill this gap by expanding the relevant empirical sample and looking at several analogous cases across a wide span of history.

Third, some work on the presidency and civil rights does span several administrations and thus provides a broader analysis than time-bound case studies.¹⁷ Yet, these too commonly have shortcomings. Ruth Morgan and Steven Shull focus exclusively on the “modern presidency,” the institution as it emerged from the New Deal. Instead, my analysis will examine several administrations since the end of the Civil War.

Other work is characterized by theoretical shortcomings. For example, Russell Riley, who analyzes a broad span of history (from Lincoln to LBJ), distinguishes his theory of nation-keeping, which involves fundamental social arrangements, from Stephen Skowronek's theory, which is constructed around presidential disruption of political institutions.¹⁸ Riley argues that the institutional disruption Skowronek describes cannot be equated with disruption in fundamental social structures. I move beyond this claim by focusing on institutions, not social arrangements. In my view, a study of institutional development and change is more useful for theory-building because institutions *affect* and *define* the parameters of presidential leadership and social change.

The fourth set of literature is presidential biographies. In this tradition, scholars rely on biographical evidence to draw conclusions about a president's personal characteristics.¹⁹ Such studies are instructive, but are of limited use because (1) they usually do not deal with the institutional determinants of leadership and instead focus only on individual presidents and (2) they fail, for the most part, to consider the political and contextual factors that shape individual choice. This latter point speaks to an enduring methodological debate in the presidency literature: the personal presidency vs. the institutional presidency.

Richard Neustadt and his contemporaries claim that presidents can affect the system through bargaining and persuasion; that style and skill shape decision-making processes.²⁰ And while these "personal presidency" advocates recognize that institutions affect presidential behavior, they have paid far less attention to them than Congressional scholars have in constructing behavioral theories.²¹ These scholars recognize that members of Congress are *not* just people; they occupy distinctive formal roles embedded

in an institutional context. As a result, member incentives are strongly shaped by this context and they behave in similar and predictable ways because of it.

In this tradition, Terry Moe prompted a methodological reawakening in the presidency literature.²² He recognized that behavioral studies promoted an unbalanced view of presidential leadership and produced complications in developing research methods and constructing theory. Instead, a “new institutionalist” approach was needed to show that the study of institutions was fundamental to theoretical development and that behavior was largely derivative.²³ For instance, the Neustadian skills of bargaining and persuasion are less useful because they cannot be fully understood outside of the institutional context from which they emerge and are exercised. Like Congressional scholars, Moe concludes that different presidents will act in similar ways in common institutional settings and situations.

Thus, I intend to nest my theory within a “new institutionalist” framework.²⁴ By focusing on individual presidents within an institutional context, I agree with Gary King and Lyn Ragsdale that, particularly in the modern era, the presidency is more than one incumbent – it is comprised of thousands of offices and actors that are “neither monolithic nor unified.”²⁵ However, like Moe, I do not discount the importance of individual characteristics. Although my research on personal variables is descriptive, informative, suggestive, and premised on the belief that they are ultimately shaped by institutional and political context, I admit that the balance between institutional and personal influences varies depending on what is being explained. For example, in a study of racial inclusion, a president’s liberal or conservative ideological predispositions toward race are important.²⁶ Furthermore, Moe admits that institutional context is

endogenous; that presidents can alter their power prospects through structural choice and the development of structural capacity. Hence, it is conceivable that presidents can use institutional resources to address situations, tasks, and challenges in ways that favor their personal strengths.²⁷

1.2 Theory

President Harry S Truman once commented that, “no one can know all the processes and stages of a president’s thinking in making important decisions. Even those closest to him...never know all the reasons why he does certain things and why he comes to certain conclusions.”²⁸ Truman’s statement may be true, but as social scientists we must attempt to link cause and effect, while at the same time recognizing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify *all* of the factors that affect presidents. My theory proceeds with this in mind.

The central proposition of this research design is that presidents routinely serve as *coalition-managers* on the issue of racial inclusion for African-Americans. A *presidential coalition* is defined as a collection of groups and interests whose goals and policy preferences are perceived to be crucial to the president’s electoral and governing power. It is important to note that while the primary mechanism for managing coalitions is the political party, I do not assume that the president’s coalition is the same as the party’s coalition (although they can overlap). This point signifies the central departure of my analysis from other studies of the relationship between national political institutions and race.²⁹ There are two reasons for this assertion.

First, while the party coalition is naturally the most reliable starting point for a president to build and maintain his own electoral coalition, it does not always constitute an Electoral College majority. In these cases, presidents must adopt positions on racial inclusion that reflect the preferences of groups and interests that he perceives to occupy a critical position in the process of building his own Electoral College majority. Second, at least since Reconstruction, presidents have often been confronted with difficult choices on racial inclusion that pit their party's long-term ideological commitments against short-term electoral opportunities and between legislating party principles or abandoning them for the policy preferences of voting blocs whose support is essential for their own political success.³⁰ Hence, my unit of analysis is the presidential, not the party, coalition.

The dependent variable in this research design is presidential position-taking, and it will be measured primarily by presidential rhetoric. The independent variable is the presidential coalition. Therefore, *presidential positions on racial inclusion are a function of the make-up of the presidential coalition*. The inevitable question then arises: How do I measure, or provide evidence for, the specific groups and interests that the president *perceives* to be necessary to secure his electoral goals? The evidence I use revolves around the imperatives of coalition-management: advisory networks, personal characteristics, and the use of institutional and strategic resources. The logic behind using these sources of evidence is discussed in the following section.

The guiding assumption of this research design is that the primary goal of presidents is electoral success.³¹ This Downsian framework leads to my central hypothesis: *Presidential positions on racial inclusion will reflect the preferences of groups and interests that a president perceives to occupy a critical position in the*

coalition-management process. In other words, presidential positions on racial inclusion will be shaped by, and tailored toward, the political preferences of groups and interests that can tip the competitive balance of power in the president's favor.

1.3 Research Design

Conceived as a comparative study of presidential positions on racial inclusion, the analytical core of this project will be drawn from three theoretically salient case studies: Republican Rutherford B. Hayes's decision to end Reconstruction in the South, Democrat Harry S Truman's efforts to court the black vote in the election of 1948, and Democrat Jimmy Carter's political neglect of African-Americans in the late 1970s.

These cases were chosen because each president came to power following a major period of political, social, and institutional change that had implications for the presidency and its relationship to African-Americans. Hayes's predecessor, Ulysses S. Grant, fulfilled the Republican Party's political promises to newly emancipated blacks following the Civil War, which made them a critical voting bloc in the party's national coalition; Truman's predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, continued the Democratic Party's history of racial exclusion by ignoring black issues, even as he tried to lift the country out of depression; and finally, Carter's party predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson, championed the most sweeping civil rights legislation in American history, which brought African-Americans into the Democratic Party's national coalition.

Given the nature of these significant developments in the political relationship between African-Americans and the White House, one would expect the positions of Grant, FDR, and LBJ to usher in a pattern of received commitments that would compel

successive partisan administrations to continue and articulate established racial positions and policies. After all, Grant, Roosevelt, and Johnson all won reelection, which suggests that any similarly-situated party successor would have political incentives to appeal to groups and interests whose allegiance was essential to presidential victory in the past. Curiously, however, Hayes, Truman, and Carter adopted political positions on race that wholly contradicted the racial legacies of their party predecessors. This research design is an attempt to understand these positions as a function of coalition-management.

1.3.1 Data and Methods

Why did Rutherford B. Hayes end Reconstruction in the South? Why did Harry Truman become more racially inclusive in 1948? Why did Jimmy Carter neglect African-Americans, an established voting bloc in the Democratic coalition, in the late 1970s? Answering these questions and identifying causal variables requires the accumulation and analysis of empirical evidence from the relevant time periods. For each case, I have identified a number of theoretically relevant factors that are expected to explain variance over time and space: presidential rhetoric, advisory networks, personal characteristics, and the use of institutional and strategic resources. However, due to the amount, diversity, and limits to available types of evidence, data collection and analysis are complicated.

Nevertheless, data will be gathered from various sources, including presidential libraries, autobiographical and biographical information, newspaper sources, the Federal Register, the Library of Congress, the National Archives, Congressional Quarterly publications, the *Public Papers of the Presidents*, *Vital Statistics on the Presidency*, *Vital Statistics on American Politics*, and *U.S. Historical Statistics* (published by the

Department of Commerce). Census data and presidential election returns will help me identify the “swing states” presidents targeted for coalition-management activities, given the structure of the Electoral College.

With the exception of the section on presidential rhetoric, the following discussion focuses primarily on process, not outcomes. James Pfiffner argues that presidency researchers must be concerned with planning and administration rather than outcomes.³² In other words, political positions are more the outcome of what presidents do to shape, mold, and knead problems and solutions. By adopting a process-oriented approach, I will invest research energy in identifying and describing the critically important evidence that will reveal the causes of presidential positions on race.

Rhetoric. The first and most logical place to measure the dependent variable – presidential position-taking – is rhetoric. Underlying a substantial and rapidly increasing literature is the premise that rhetoric matters; that presidents can make their positions known and influence public opinion through speech.³³ In an important piece on presidential rhetoric, Jeffrey Cohen counts the number of sentences in State of the Union addresses that refer to civil rights policy.³⁴ I extend this empirical sample by looking not only at State of the Union addresses, but other “major speeches” as well, including those in the campaign context, speeches to relevant groups and interests, inaugural addresses, and other addresses to Congress. In addition, I will identify and examine the language of a president’s race-based legislative initiatives, which can also provide insight into position-taking on racial inclusion. Finally and perhaps most importantly, while rhetoric itself gives social scientists a glimpse of presidential positions, a better indicator of the nature of presidential position-taking is *substantive content*. Here I suggest that

sentences in which a president merely mentions race, as opposed to taking a position, are mostly symbolic. Policy detail, on the other hand, provides substantively relevant information about the direction a president intends to take.

To be sure, identifying “what” presidents say on race-specific issues and then analyzing these positions is inevitably difficult, given different historical and contextual language. For instance, in the aftermath of Reconstruction, presidents used language like “home-rule” and “local control” to appeal to Southern whites, while during the 1940s and 50s, presidents often used the language of racial inclusion to draw sharp distinctions between the U.S. and its Cold War adversaries. For example, the word “Negro” was not perceived as a derogatory term, but was used extensively by President Truman in the same sentence as ensuring “personal freedom” and “personal opportunity” in the South and correcting the “imperfections in our practice of democracy.” In the late 1970s, Jimmy Carter spoke sympathetically about those who sought to maintain the “ethnic purity” of their neighborhoods against “alien groups” and “black intrusion.”³⁵ These examples illustrate that researchers must be attentive to the meaning and significance of presidential language in specific contexts when drawing theoretical conclusions.

Advisory Networks. A second source of empirical evidence comes from the advice presidents receive. Paul Quirk contends that the central issue of studying the presidency is to explain how and why presidents make decisions.³⁶ That is the purpose of this research design, and when one focuses on presidential decisions, advising plays an important role.³⁷

“Advising” is treated here more as a task rather than a property of particular individuals, although individuals are important. I concentrate on *advisory networks*,

which link actors at several levels of analysis ranging from the individual to the inter-organizational. The reason for this focus is that examining a single or few actors might lead one to overemphasize their importance or miss the critical interplay and dynamics between individuals and their institutional contexts – for example, the Secretary of State’s advice to the president is often the product of a hierarchical chain of information-checking within the State Department. Thus, the network level largely avoids the problem of missing the impact of diverse structures and multiple participants.

A presidential advisory network encompasses the president and individuals (e.g. the Chief of Staff), subunits (e.g. the OMB), and organizations (e.g. the ACLU) that provide input into presidential decisions about race. Moreover, an administration may have multiple advisory networks, which vary according to the policy area, the point in the president’s term, or the frequency of the decision to be made. I am primarily concerned with the interaction among members of these networks (or the absence of such interaction) and identifying and analyzing the advice presidents receive about formulating their positions on racial inclusion. Important factors to consider are the nature and timing of the advice a president receives; the president’s views of the credibility and importance of that advice; and the impact of the advice on presidential decisions about race.

I therefore focus on six arenas within the Executive Office.³⁸ Depending on the time period and the particular evolutionary stage of the presidential institution, these groups may be of more, less, or no importance to the president: (1) legislative liaison; (2) the domestic policy staff; (3) the economic policy staff (4) the OMB; (5) Cabinet officers and departments; and (6) the president’s personal staff – counsels, public liaison, speech writers, personal secretaries, press assistants, and top White House staff.

Personal Characteristics. Richard Neustadt's proposition that "the presidency is no place for amateurs" applies for any study of presidential leadership and racial inclusion.³⁹ As I will show, although presidential *skill* is a less significant predictor of position-taking than political context, the extent and depth of a president's political experience and expertise affects his ability to understand the political problems facing his administration. In other words, skill gives presidents the most valuable faculty of *perception*; that is, a better understanding of their political context.⁴⁰ It allows presidents to see more clearly the possibilities of managing coalitions given the constraints of a specific institutional and historical context, whether it is to create, invigorate, or preserve the racial status quo.

Furthermore, Erwin Hargrove proposed that moral purpose is the making a president's leadership.⁴¹ Certainly, presidents care a great deal about their legacy and often inject a sense of moral purpose into the actions and policies that flow from their administrations. By communicating shared values and goals, a president can enjoy the achievements in politics and policy that arise from what James MacGregor Burns calls "transformational leadership."⁴² In this sense, understanding a president's *values* and *ideology* can provide insight into the factors that shape his willingness and ability to respond to contextual, race-oriented expectations.

Use of Institutional and Strategic Resources. Presidents engage in strategic analysis in order to link available and appropriate political resources to the decisions and processes aimed at achieving goals.⁴³ Not surprisingly, different institutional resources are available to presidents in different contexts. For instance, Hayes had minimal resources and was more constrained than Truman or Carter, who inherited a highly institutionalized office that provided them with more avenues for independent action on racial inclusion.

Yet, despite context and time period, all presidents acquire *formal* and *informal* powers, although the degree and extent to which they use these powers varies. The president's formal powers, which I will examine in detail, are enumerated in Article II. They include informing "the Congress on the state of the union," recommending measures to Congress, and the veto power. Another formal power at the president's disposal is the executive order, which is the subject of Ruth Morgan's work on the presidency and civil rights. The executive order is a reliable tool for implementing significant policies unilaterally.⁴⁴ Certainly in matters of racial inclusion, presidents have used this formal power to make controversial decisions. Therefore, identifying the use or non-use of strategic resources and then examining substantive content provides a reliable and visible expression of a president's racial positions.

While the president's formal powers tend to remain constant, limited, and (often) shared over time, his informal powers vary depending on factors such as skill and political context. One significant measurement of the use of informal powers that I will examine is the extent and degree of reorganization planning. Many scholars recognize the importance of administration and executive reorganization to the effective functioning of the presidency, particularly in the 20th century.⁴⁵ Hence, I will identify and examine the degree and extent to which presidents construct new institutional mechanisms to seek out, confront, or deal with race. Analyzing the scope and effectiveness of these arrangements is an essential part of understanding presidential position-taking on racial inclusion.

1.4 Significance of Research

My theory will add value to our understanding of race and the presidency in three ways. First, in a social scientific sense, it will allow us to better understand not only the positions of individual presidents on racial inclusion, but also how those positions are a reflection of the state of the *presidency*, or its evolution as an institution. No study to date has examined how the institution's political development affects the positions presidents take on racial inclusion. Second, the extent to which presidents do or do not address racial inclusion will allow us to draw normative conclusions about the quality of democratic representation emanating from the White House. Third, and perhaps most importantly, this analysis will provide a theoretical baseline for understanding presidential leadership on racial inclusion in the future, particularly toward minority groups other than African-Americans. This is especially relevant for 21st century presidents, who will be compelled to build and manage coalitions of non-white voters in an increasingly multi-ethnic America.

I expect this research to culminate in a dissertation-length manuscript that describes and explains the causal relationship between the imperatives of coalition-management and presidential positions on racial inclusion. By nesting my analysis within a number of scholarly traditions, this study will represent a test of new institutionalist and coalition-management theses and address lingering questions about the utility of individual vs. institutional approaches to the presidency.

1.5 Endnotes

¹ For example, see Jeffrey K. Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Edward G. Carmines and John A. Stimson, *Issue Evolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); George C. Edwards III, *At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Paul C. Light, *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Reagan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Jeffrey E. Cohen, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda" *American Journal of Political Science* 1995 (39, 1).

² For exceptions, see Russell Riley, *The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality: Nation-Keeping from 1831-1965* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Steven Shull, *American Civil Rights Policy from Truman to Clinton* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

³ V.O. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1949).

⁴ Earle Black and Merle Black, *The Vital South: How Presidents are Elected* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); -----, *The Rise of Southern Republicans* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).

⁵ Carmines and Stimson (1989).

⁶ Garth E. Pauley, *The Modern Presidency and Civil Rights: Rhetoric on Race from Roosevelt to Nixon* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), p. 3.

⁷ James MacGregor Burns, *Presidential Government: The Crucible of Leadership* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 281.

⁸ Richard Longaker, *The President and Individual Liberties* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 18.

⁹ Peri E. Arnold, *Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization Planning, 1905-1996* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998).

¹⁰ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1944).

¹¹ Matthew M. Hoffman, "The Illegitimate President: Minority Vote Dilution and the Electoral College." *Yale Law Journal* 1996 (105, no. 4).

¹² Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, *The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 324.

¹³ Riley, p. 10, 20-21.

¹⁴ For examples, see Paul Frymer, *Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Scott C. James, *Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party-System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884-1936* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Christina Wolbrecht, *The Politics of Women's Rights: Parties, Positions, and Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

¹⁵ For examples, see Carl M. Brauer, *John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Robert F. Burk, *The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984); Donald J. Lisio, *Hoover, Blacks, and Lilywhites: A Study of Southern Strategies* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985); Michael R. Gardner, *Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002).

¹⁶ Bruce Miroff, "Presidential Leverage over Social Movements: The Johnson White House and Civil Rights" *Journal of Politics* 1981 (43), p. 3.

¹⁷ For examples, see Ruth P. Morgan, *The President and Civil Rights: Policy-Making by Executive Order* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970); Riley (1999); Shull (1999).

¹⁸ Stephen Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).

¹⁹ For examples, see James M Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York: Harvest Books, 1956); Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (New York: Mariner Books, 1965); Samuel Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997); Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Presidential Personality and Performance* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998); Fred I. Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton* (New York: The Free Press, 2001).

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- ²⁰ Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan* (New York: The Free Press, 1990).
- ²¹ For examples, see David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Keith Krehbiel, *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, *The President in the Legislative Arena* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); ----- (eds.), *Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000).
- ²² Terry M. Moe, "The Politicized Presidency" in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (eds.), *The New Direction in American Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985).
- ²³ James March and Johann P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions* (New York: The Free Press, 1989).
- ²⁴ For examples, see James W. Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky, *Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership: from Washington through Lincoln* (New Brunswick: Transaction Press, 1989); Sidney Milkis, *The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System since the New Deal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Skowronek (1997).
- ²⁵ Gary King and Lyn Ragsdale, *The Elusive Executive: Discovering Statistical Patterns in the Presidency* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988), p. 84.
- ²⁶ See Burk (1984); Shull (1999); Pauley (2001).
- ²⁷ Erwin C. Hargrove, "Presidential Personality and Leadership Style" in George C. Edwards III, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), *Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 82-86.
- ²⁸ Theodore C. Sorensen, *Decision-Making in the White House: The Olive Branch or the Arrows* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 10.
- ²⁹ See, for example, Frymer.
- ³⁰ Of course, presidents often have strong political incentives to be partisan in the governing context. For example, the president must work with Congressional party members so his agenda is introduced, fought for and supported on the floor.
- ³¹ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper Collins, 1957).
- ³² James Pfiffner, *The Managerial Presidency* (Pacific Grove: Brooks Cole, 1991).
- ³³ Tulis (1988); Karlyn Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Craig Allen Smith and Kathy B. Smith, *The White House Speaks: Presidential Leadership as Persuasion* (Westport: Praeger Press, 1994); Pauley (2001).
- ³⁴ Cohen (1995).
- ³⁵ Klinkner and Smith, p. 295.
- ³⁶ Paul Quirk, "Presidential Competence" in Michael Nelson (ed.), *The Presidency and the Political System* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1990).
- ³⁷ See Karen M. Hult and Charles Walcott, *Governing Public Organizations: Politics, Structures, and Institutional Design* (Pacific Grove: Brooks Cole, 1990).
- ³⁸ I focus on the same six arenas of the Executive Office as Light, p. 8.
- ³⁹ Neustadt, p. 151.
- ⁴⁰ Erwin C. Hargrove, *The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of our Nature* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), p. 36-38.
- ⁴¹ Ibid. p. 30-32.
- ⁴² James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: HarperCollins, 1978).
- ⁴³ Charles Lindblom, "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through" *Public Administration Review* 1979 (November/December).
- ⁴⁴ Kenneth R. Mayer, "Executive Orders and Presidential Power" *Journal of Politics* 1999 (61, 2).
- ⁴⁵ See Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacity, 1877-1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Arnold (1998).