

**Conversion or Mobilization? Using Religion's Growing Potency in U.S. Politics to
Revisit Realignment Theory**

David E. Campbell
University of Notre Dame
Dcampbe4@nd.edu

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Abstract

In this paper, I revisit an old debate with new data. More specifically, I use the growing salience of religion in U.S. politics to illuminate the process by which new party coalitions form. Drawing largely on the New Deal realignment, political scientists have long debated the process by which a realignment occurs. One camp holds that during a realigning period, many voters undergo *conversion*, and switch party identification. Another camp argues that, at least in the case of the New Deal, previously unaffiliated voters were *mobilized*, assuming a party affiliation for the first time. The last two decades have seen the rising salience of religion as a force in American electoral forces—so much so that White Conservative Protestants are now counted among the Republicans’ staunchest supporters. This shift offers an ideal opportunity to revisit the question of what happens during a period of shifting electoral coalitions. In other words, where did these new Republicans come from? Are they converted Democrats? Or were they previously non-affiliated voters who have been mobilized to identify with the GOP? Arguments for both processes can be found in the literature. To test which better describes the “religious realignment,” I use a panel study spanning 1980 to 1990. These panel data, in addition to cross-sectional surveys over the same period, enable me to test whether the growing link between religious affiliation and partisanship is a result of conversion or mobilization—or both. The answer appears to be that while processes have occurred, mobilization is a more common route for religiously-committed Republicans to have taken.

I begin with a simple premise: over the last twenty to twenty-five years, the American political landscape has been remade. Religion, or more specifically religious commitment, divides the American electorate such that -- at least among white Americans -- the churched are mostly Republican, the unchurched mostly Democratic. Others have carefully chronicled the imprint this devotional divide has left on American politics (Layman 2001, 1997; Layman and Carmines 1997; Petrocik 1998; Miller and Shanks 1996; Legee and Kellstedt 1993; Boke and Maio 1999; Kohut et al. 2000). My intention here is to build on this literature to see what we can learn about this particular realignment and perhaps electoral realignments in general by examining the specifics of the growing “devotional divide.”

As a precursor to this analysis -- it is so preliminary that I hesitate to describe it as a paper -- in an earlier piece I provided evidence that this religious realignment has occurred predominantly among younger voters, precisely what the socialization theory of realignment would lead us to expect (Campbell 2002). Socialization theory, in turn, is a logical extension of the classic Michigan model of party ID: partisan affiliation is acquired in a voter’s youth and over the life span is better described as a constant than a variable (Campbell et al. 1960; Beck 1974).

My earlier paper compared young and old voters at successive points in time. Left unexplored was the question of what happens to young voters as they pass through a period of electoral volatility. How malleable are these young voters? During their first decade as members of the voting public, to what extent do their partisan affiliations shift to conform to the evolving partisan cleavage?

Answering this question informs us regarding the specifics of the religious realignment in American politics, which in turn offers insights into the phenomenon of electoral realignment in general. Regarding the specifics, it could be that the new Republicans are largely defectors from Democratic ranks. Or it could be that these new Republicans have arisen from the politically quiescent. Until the “great awakening” of the religious right, many religiously committed voters – particularly fundamentalist Christians – were uninvolved in politics. It seems probable that this would also mean that they did not have roots in either party. These two alternative explanations for the source of the new Republicans echo a longstanding, and unresolved, debate regarding the wellspring of support for FDR’s Democratic Party during the New Deal realignment. Where did all those new Democrats come from? One camp argues that they were “converted” – they once were Republicans but switched to a Democratic affiliation (Sundquist 1983). The other argues that they were “mobilized” – the new Democrats came largely from among the ranks of new immigrants and others who had no connection to either major party (Andersen 1979). To borrow the language of this debate about the new Democrats in the 1930s, I am essentially asking whether these new Republicans in the 1980s were *converted* or *mobilized*. Obviously, there would have been both conversion and mobilization during both the 1930s and the 1980s, so the question is less *which* process occurred, and more *the extent to which* each process occurred. Admittedly, the two situations are not exactly parallel. As FDR crafted his coalition, mobilization referred to the acquisition of a Democratic party ID by first or second-generation Americans. In the 1980s, the new Republicans mobilized during the religious realignment would have generally flowed not from voters who were new citizens (and

thus previously unable to vote) but instead from newly-involved citizens (who had thus previously been able to engage in electoral politics but chose not to). For the purposes of this paper, I will consider new Republican identifiers who were once Independents or did not have a partisan affiliation as having been mobilized. If they were previously Democrats, they have been converted.

To settle the question of whether conversion or mobilization better describes either the New Deal realignment of the 1930s or the religious realignment of the 1980s requires longitudinal data. That is, individuals need to be interviewed at one point in time and then reinterviewed at a later point in time in order to track any individual-level changes in their partisan proclivities. Such longitudinal data was unheard of in the 1930s, when survey research was only in its infancy. Even today it is rare. The National Election Studies, for example, only conducts panel studies periodically, and then only over a six year stretch. Fortunately, a new source of longitudinal data has become available which enables us to examine the dynamics partisan affiliation during the period of the growing devotional divide -- *Monitoring the Future: A Continuing Study of American Youth*. Primarily designed to monitor the drug and alcohol use of American adolescents, the Monitoring the Future (MTF) study contains interviews with nationally-representative samples of high school seniors, and has been conducted annually since 1975. Each year, roughly 15,000 students are surveyed.¹ As a study about drug use, it

¹ Monitoring the Future is administered to respondents in their schools. Schools, both public and private, are selected to produce a nationally representative sample of high school seniors. If a particular school declines to participate, it is replaced with another that matches its profile. In smaller schools the whole senior class participates, while in larger schools a representative sample of up to 350 students is used. There are thus two response rates that apply to these data: the rate of the schools, and the rate of the individual students. The initial response rate of schools has fluctuated from 1977 (the first year for which this figure is reported) and 1996—starting around 60 percent, increasing in the mid-1980s to roughly 70 percent and dropping again to 53 percent in 1996. However, when the response rate is calculated by including the replacement schools, it has never dropped below 95 percent. The principal investigators of the

might not be expected to shed much light on political behavior. Buried amidst its questions about controlled substances, though, is an array of items that specifically address political attitudes, including partisan affiliation.

In addition to its cross-sectional component, MTF is also a panel study.² A subset of respondents is selected for follow-up surveys every two years past high school, and asked exactly the same questions as at baseline.³ As a result, MTF provides precisely the data that are necessary to examine shifts in partisan allegiance among voters as they pass through the early years of their eligibility to vote.⁴ These data thus allow us to track:

(1) the same group of respondents across time

(2) different groups of respondents of the same age at various points in time

(1) consists of a panel of respondents who were first interviewed as high school

Monitoring the Future series note that if fluctuating response rates lead to selection bias, the results should also fluctuate erratically over time. They do not. Admittedly, there may be a constant selection bias among schools, but if so the measurement of trends is unaffected. In contrast to other national surveys, the response rate for individual students has increased from the 1970s to the 1990s—from 77 percent in 1976 to 83 percent in 1996. The most common reason that students are missed is simply their absence from school on the day the questionnaire is administered, as less than 1.5 percent of students explicitly refuse to participate (Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman 2001).

² While the cross-sectional MTF data are available publicly at no cost, the panel data are released only at the discretion of the MTF principal investigators, and at considerable cost. I was only able to acquire these data with the financial assistance of Harvard University's Center for American Political Studies and The Saguaro Seminar: Civic Engagement in America. I am grateful for the generosity of these two organizations.

³ More precisely, over a two year period, the whole panel is re-interviewed. Half of the panel is contacted in odd years, half in even. According to the documentation provided by the MTF principal investigators, the retention rates of their panels range from 77 percent in the first wave following high school to 53 percent in the oldest panel (the seventh biennial follow-up, when respondents were about the age of 32).

⁴ MTF consists of interviews with high school students only, thus excluding the roughly 15 percent of this age cohort who drop out of school. Obviously, this constrains the extent to which the sample is fully representative of all American adolescents.

seniors 1980, and then again in 1989/1990, precisely the period during which most of the rearrangement along religious lines occurred. (2) employs cross-sectional comparisons of high school seniors in 1980, 1988, and 1994.

Cross-Sectional Comparisons

We begin with the cross-sectional data, comparing the partisan affiliation of high school seniors in 1980, 1988, and 1994. This allows us to examine the extent to which religious commitment has come to define a significant cleavage among young voters, and offers a look at the shifting partisan distribution of the newest voters in the electorate.

The MTF measure of party identification asks respondents “to describe your political preference.” They can choose from a range of options: Strong Republican, Weak Republican, Weak Democrat, Strong Democrat, Independent, No Preference, Other, Don’t Know/Haven’t Decided.⁵ In Figure 1, strong and weak partisans are grouped together, allowing us to compare the percentage of respondents who identify either as Republicans or Democrats in the three years. For both parties, the general trend is a modest increase in identifiers from 1980 to 1988, with a drop off from 1988 to 1994. In both 1988 and 1994, Republicans hold a slight edge.⁶

⁵ This question is a different way of determining partisan affiliation than the standard question asked in the National Election Studies. It results in a different partisan distribution than the NES measure, since the MTF question produces no “independent leaners” and the NES question results in very few respondents who report that they do not have, or they do not know, their party identification. There are merits and demerits of both measures. Because it explicitly allows respondents to indicate that they do not know their partisan affiliation, the MTF has an advantage for this particular analysis, which deals with the acquisition of a party ID.

⁶ Weighted data. This graph combines both white and black Americans. Later on, racial difference in party ID will be accounted for.

The next step is to examine whether these trends vary by level of religiosity. A simple index of religiosity was created using two items asked of MTF respondents: attendance at religious services and importance of religion. These measures capture different but equally important dimensions of religiosity: (1) participation in a religious community, where political cues can be received and reinforced; and (2) salience of religious beliefs. Both have been shown to be significant factors linking religion and political beliefs (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988; Guth and Green 1993). Buttressing the claim that they are fellow-travelers, the index has an alpha coefficient of 0.75.⁷

In Figures 2 through 4 we see how these trends in party ID vary as respondents are split into the top, middle, and bottom third of the religiosity index. Students in the middle third of the religiosity index mirror the overall trend we observed in Figure 1. At the top and bottom of the index, however, we see different trends. Among students in the bottom third of the religiosity index, the percentage of Democrats held steady at roughly 20 percent from 1980 to 1994, while between 1988 and 1994 the percentage of Republicans dropped from 22 percent to a little under 14 percent. At the top of the religiosity index, we see a different picture. Between 1980 and 1988, the percentage of Republicans rose from 22 to 31 percent, holding steady through 1994. Democrats held steady between 1980 and 1988, only to drop off from 29 to 20 percent from 1988 to 1994. In other words, between 1988 and 1994 there was a sharp divergence between the most and least religious new voters, as measured at the time that they were just entering the electorate.

Unadulterated cross-tabulations like those reported in Figures 1 through 4 leave open the possibility that the effect attributed to religiosity is spuriously the result of other

⁷ For a more thorough discussion of this index, see Campbell (2002).

factors. I turn next, therefore, to a multivariate test of religiosity's impact on partisan affiliation from 1980 to 1994. To do so, I rely on multinomial logistic regression. This enables me to retain the non-ordinal nature of the partisan affiliation measure. Typically party ID is modeled as a continuous variable, based on the dubious assertion that Independents' preferences fall in between Republicans and Democrats. Even more problematic are the "don't knows," which among high school seniors can constitute a quarter of the respondents. With multinomial logit, the dependent variable is not assumed to have any ordinality. Instead, the dependent variable is treated as a group of non-ordered categories, which means that the analyst does not have to make any assumptions about the placement of each category relative to the others.⁸

More technically, the model estimates $\beta(1)$, $\beta(2)$, $\beta(3)$, and $\beta(4)$, where

1= Republican

2= Democrat

3 = Independent/ Other

4 = Don't Know

$$\Pr(y=1) = \frac{e^{x \beta(1)}}{e^{x \beta(1)} + e^{x \beta(2)} + e^{x \beta(3)} + e^{x \beta(4)}}$$

⁸ I have chosen to group the Independents together with those respondents who indicate that they have a partisan preference other than Democrat or Republican (which owing to the limits of a paper and pencil questionnaire remains unspecified). The "other" category is small, constituting only 2.7 percent of respondents. Also, note that the questionnaire groups Independents with those who explicitly express "no preference." I have chosen to treat this group as separate from those who choose "don't know, haven't decided," although I concede that this is probably splitting hairs. At this point they appear to behave differently enough to warrant being separated, although as my analysis continues I may choose to group the independents and don't knows together.

$$\Pr(y=2) = \frac{e^{x\beta(2)}}{e^{x\beta(1)} + e^{x\beta(2)} + e^{x\beta(3)} + e^{x\beta(4)}}$$

$$\Pr(y=3) = \frac{e^{x\beta(3)}}{e^{x\beta(1)} + e^{x\beta(2)} + e^{x\beta(3)} + e^{x\beta(4)}}$$

$$\Pr(y=4) = \frac{e^{x\beta(4)}}{e^{x\beta(1)} + e^{x\beta(2)} + e^{x\beta(3)} + e^{x\beta(4)}}$$

In order to identify the model, $\beta(1)$ is arbitrarily set to 0. This means that each coefficient is interpreted as that variable's impact relative to $\beta(1)$ – or in other words, relative to Republican party ID.

The control variables include whether the respondent lives in a Southern state, gender, parents' education⁹, race, and Catholic religious affiliation¹⁰, while the key independent variable of interest is the religiosity index. Tables 1-3 display three multinomial logit models, one for each of 1980, 1988, and 1994 respectively. For now, our attention is drawn to the coefficient for the religiosity index in the Democratic

⁹ This is the mean of the parents' education level. Owing to confidentiality concerns, the MTF administrators will not release data on the education level of each individual parent. Its inclusion is meant to proxy socioeconomic status.

¹⁰ For the most part, I have chosen to leave the question of religious affiliation aside in this analysis, as the MTF measure of denominational affiliation is limited to a few broad categories. Other evidence has suggested that the critical factor relating to religion is less denomination and more level of devotion. See Campbell (2002) for a more thorough discussion. Nonetheless, I have controlled for Catholic affiliation in this equation; it has no substantive bearing on the impact of religiosity.

category. We see that it is negative in all three years. In general terms, this means that in each year the higher respondents score on the religiosity index, the more likely they are to identify as Republicans *rather than Democrats*. The growing magnitude of the coefficient means that the religiosity-Republican (relative to Democrats) relationship increased in strength over time.

The sheer array of coefficients, not to mention the fact that they are based on maximum likelihood estimation, makes these tables difficult to interpret. To aid in their interpretation I have generated a series of figures displaying the probability of a respondent identifying as either a Republican or Democrat, calculated from the coefficients in Tables 1 through 3. The control variables have been set to create a “hypothetical respondent”: a Southern white male who is not Catholic and whose parents have a mean level of education. By holding the control variables at these values, I can then vary the religiosity index to see its impact *ceteris paribus*.

In Figure 5 we see the probability¹¹ of a respondent selecting either a Republican or Democratic party ID when the religiosity index is set to its minimum, in 1980, 1988, and 1994 respectively. There was a slight increase in Republican affiliation from 1980 to 1988, and a decline from 1988 to 1994. Democratic affiliation decreased from 1980 to 1988, but flat-lined from 1988 to 1994. At the mean level of religiosity, displayed in Figure 6, we see a steady decrease in Democratic affiliation, while again Republican affiliation spikes in 1988, only to drop off again in 1994 to its 1980 level. At the maximum level of religiosity (Figure 7) Republican party ID increase considerably from 1980 to 1988, which then held steady in 1994. Meanwhile, Democratic party ID

¹¹ Since these are probabilities, they should technically be displayed on a 0 to 1 scale. I have chosen to display them as percentages in order to enhance the comparability with the descriptive figures.

decreased steadily, resulting in a gap between Democrats and Republicans of over 38 percentage points in 1994.

In sum, while the Democrats lost ground across the whole population, they lost the most ground among the most highly religious new voters. Likewise, the Republicans gained the most among the same group.

These models reveal trends in Republican versus Democratic affiliation. Focusing on the partisan identifiers only, however, leaves the fate of the Independents and Don't Knows unexamined. To what extent did Republican gains come at the expense of losses among Independents or Don't Knows? Figure 8 provides an answer. In this figure, we see the estimated probabilities for all four categories when the religiosity index is set to its maximum. Republican gains from 1980 to 1988 appear to come from all three of the other categories: Democrats, Independents, and Don't Knows. From 1988 to 1994, we again see that the Democrats shrank, while the Don't Knows more or less held steady and the Independents grew moderately.

These data indicate what happened to three cohorts of new voters at different points in time. They affirm the devotional divide, and suggest that Republican gains have not come solely from one source. The implication is that from 1980 to 1988 – the period of greatest growth for the Republicans among religiously committed voters – both conversion and mobilization characterize the process by which the change occurred. However, with cross-sectional data we can only see how the partisan distribution changed across three cross-sections of time, which does not address whether individuals themselves have changed. Without longitudinal data this would be all that we could say

about the changes over this period. The next step, therefore, is to use the longitudinal component of the MTF study to examine changes within the same individuals over time.

Longitudinal Data

Figure 9 displays the change in partisan affiliation among members of a panel first interviewed as high school seniors in 1980 (based on simple cross-tabulations only). In 1980, just at the cusp of the Reagan years, Republican identifiers fell behind the three other categories at 21 percent, although with 23 percent Democrats were only slightly ahead. An equal proportion of high school seniors, slightly less than 30 percent, identified as Independents or said that they did not know their partisan affiliation.

The most noticeable trend is the steep decline in respondents who report not having a partisan affiliation, with a decline in Independents that is also pronounced but not quite as steep. Concomitantly, the percentage of both Republican and Democratic identifiers increased from 1980 to 1989-90, with the Republican line at a much steeper incline than its Democratic counterpart. Part of what we see has a life-cycle explanation: this is the period in young Americans' lives when past research would lead us to expect them to settle into a partisan identity (Jennings and Markus 1984; Jennings and Niemi 1981). There is undoubtedly a period effect in play as well. As this was a decade of Republican presidents exclusively occupying the White House, it is not surprising that the GOP experienced the biggest gains in partisan identifiers.

Next, we again turn to a multinomial logit model in order to control for other potentially confounding factors. Table 3 already displays the results for a model predicting party ID in 1980; in Table 4 we see the results for 1989-90. Using these

coefficients, I have once more calculated the probability that a hypothetical respondent with the same characteristics as above selects each partisan category for. In Figure 10, we see the results of setting the religiosity index to its minimum in both 1980 and 1989-90.¹² Among the least religious respondents, there is a moderate increase in Republican identifiers from 23 percent to 33 percent, with the Democrats steady at 24 percent. Independents and Don't Knows both decrease, the former from 30 percent to 26 percent and the latter from 23 percent to 16 percent.

Figure 11 uses the same coefficients as Figure 10, but now the religiosity index has been set to its maximum. In contrast to the gently sloping lines of Figure 10, here we see much sharper inclines. Spiking upward are the Republican identifiers, who jump from 36 percent to 65 percent, while all three of the other groups show marked, although not as dramatic, decreases. While the slopes vary a little – there is steeper decline for Don't Knows than Independents or Democrats – they each show a common downward trend.

Figure 11 brings us a little closer to determining whether the swelling in Republican affiliation among the highly religious has been more a matter of mobilization than conversion. Based on these results, we can see that the Republican gains (at least among this cohort of voters) have come at the expense of Democrats, Independents, and Don't Knows in roughly equal proportions. In other words, this way of looking at the process suggests that Republicans were both mobilized *and* converted.

¹² As a longitudinal study, the question arises regarding whether the appropriate measure is religiosity in 1980 or 1989/90. The correlation across the two points in time is 0.58. I have chosen to use religiosity in 1980, but the results are substantively unchanged when religiosity in 1989/90 is substituted. An initial examination of a change in the level of religiosity suggests that this has no independent effect on party ID, although I intend to examine that question in more depth.

While Figure 11 indicates the shifting partisan distributions as a function of religiosity, it still leaves open the question of what leads individual voters to switch to a Republican affiliation. In this final section of the analysis, therefore, I explicitly model the decision to adopt a new party ID -- perhaps the strongest test of mobilization versus conversion. I thus created a dichotomous dependent variable, coded 1 if a respondent switched from being a Democrat, Independent, or Don't Know in 1980 to a Republican in 1989-90. Table 4 displays the results of a logistic regression predicting a switch to the GOP with the same array of independent variables as above. We see that the coefficient for the religiosity index is positive and statistically significant, indicating that greater religiosity led to a higher probability of switching to a Republican affiliation through the 1980s. How much higher is indicated in Figure 12. The first two columns represent the probability that a hypothetical respondent with the same characteristics as described above switches to a Republican party ID, at first the minimum and then the maximum level of religiosity. The difference in height between the two bars thus represents the effect of religiosity -- for all of the respondents taken together, this is an increase of 18 percentage points.

Column 1 confirms what we have been led to expect: the more religious a young voter, the more likely she was to adopt a Republican affiliation in the 1980s. The models in columns 2 through 4 use the same method to test explicitly the source of those new Republicans. Each one displays a model of religiosity's impact on switching from the Democrats, Independents, and Don't Knows respectively. The model in column 2, for example, is restricted to only those respondents who reported that they were Democrats in 1980. In this case, a positive coefficient for religiosity would be evidence of

conversion. It turns out that the coefficient is positive, but falls well outside the conventional boundaries for statistical significance.¹³ We are thus left with the conclusion that by this, the most stringent, test the evidence for conversion remains suggestive at best. Columns 3 and 4 display comparable models for Independents and Don't Knows. A positive coefficient for either or both would support the mobilization hypothesis. In both cases, religiosity's coefficient is both positive and well past the conventional threshold for statistical significant – providing much clearer evidence for mobilization. Figure 12 displays the impact of religiosity on the probability of switching party ID for each model in succession. We see that religiosity's impact on switching is greatest for the Don't Knows, whose probability of switching climbs from 15 percent to 54 percent as religiosity varies from its minimum to its maximum. The Independents also have a 54 percent chance of switching at the highest level of religiosity, but start from a higher level (26 percent) at the lowest level of religiosity.

Conclusion

This preliminary analysis has served twin purposes. If nothing else, it has introduced a valuable new data source for studying the dynamics of party identification among young voters. It has also provided an early and thus tentative answer to the question of whether, in the era of a religious realignment, the new Republicans came to their new-found partisan identity through a process of conversion or mobilization. While both processes were clearly at work, only mobilization passes the most difficult test. It seems fair to conclude that as religiously committed (white) Americans came to identify

¹³ This nonrelationship does not appear to be due to the smaller sample size. With 352 observations, this is still a fairly large sample, and as we will see religiosity is able to achieve significance in the other subgroups, which are of comparable size.

as Republicans, they were more likely to be switching from partisan non-commitment than from Democratic affiliation.

An analysis of the 1980s, of course, does not settle the debate over the New Deal realignment. The process might very well have been different in the 1930s than the 1980s. This new source of data has, however, provided evidence for an old hypothesis: early socialization into a partisan affiliation is “sticky.” If high school seniors identified as Democrats in 1980 they were likely (although not certain) to remain Democrats through the following decade, notwithstanding their level of religious devotion. This is in sharp contrast to the widening divide in partisan identification between religious and secular voters observed as successive cohorts of new voters enter the electorate.

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Figure 1. Party ID of High School Seniors




Figure 2. Party ID of High School Seniors
Bottom Third of Religiosity Index




Figure 3. Party ID of High School Seniors
Middle Third of Religiosity Index




Figure 4. Party ID of High School Seniors
Top Third of Religiosity Index




Table 1. Party ID (1980)
Results from multinomial logistic regression

Democrat	
Religiosity	-0.073 (0.039) *
South	0.264 (0.147) *
Female	0.199 (0.132)
Parents' education	-0.024 (0.006) ***
Black	1.622 (0.237) ***
Catholic	0.605 (0.149) ***
Constant	0.696 (0.271) ***
Independent/Other	
Religiosity	-0.134 (0.036) ***
South	-0.357 (0.147) **
Female	0.141 (0.124)
Parents' education	-0.021 (0.005) ***
Black	0.856 (0.251) ***
Catholic	0.504 (0.140) ***
Constant	1.398 (0.253) ***
Don't Know	
Religiosity	-0.123 (0.037) ***
South	-0.045 (0.145)
Female	0.749 (0.129) ***
Parents' education	-0.032 (0.005) ***
Black	1.262 (0.240) ***
Catholic	0.497 (0.145) ***
Constant	1.191 (0.261) ***
N	2233

Republican is the excluded category

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 2. Party ID (1988)
Results from multinomial logistic regression

Democrat	
Religiosity	-0.077(0.036) **
South	-0.126 (0.137)
Female	0.478 (0.124) ***
Parents' education	-0.12 (0.005) **
Black	2.727 (0.282) ***
Catholic	0.212 (0.143)
Constant	0.099 (0.262)
Independent/Other	
Religiosity	-0.233 (0.035) ***
South	-0.182 (0.133)
Female	0.452 (0.121) ***
Parents' education	-0.021 (0.005) ***
Black	1.577 (0.301) ***
Catholic	-0.143 (0.142)
Constant	1.321 (0.248) ***
Don't Know	
Religiosity	-0.164 (0.037) ***
South	-0.106 (0.142)
Female	0.813 (0.130) ***
Parents' education	-0.021 (0.005) ***
Black	1.89 (0.301) ***
Catholic	0.056 (0.150)
Constant	0.518 (0.268) **
N	2193

Republican is the excluded category

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 3. Party ID (1988)
Results from multinomial logistic regression

Democrat	
Religiosity	-0.271 (0.039) ***
South	-0.229 (0.148)
Female	0.525 (0.139) ***
Parents' education	-0.012 (0.006) **
Black	3.022 (0.338) ***
Catholic	0.332 (0.163) **
Constant	0.850 (0.293) ***
Independent/Other	
Religiosity	-0.326 (0.034) ***
South	-0.049 (0.130)
Female	0.087 (0.123)
Parents' education	-0.022 (0.005)
Black	1.934 (0.341) ***
Catholic	0.251 (0.145) *
Constant	2.247 (0.259) ***
Don't Know	
Religiosity	-0.282 (0.037) ***
South	-0.103 (0.143)
Female	0.659 (0.136) ***
Parents' education	-0.0260 (0.006) ***
Black	2.416 (0.343) ***
Catholic	0.253 (0.159)
Constant	1.504 (0.282)
N	2142

Republican is the excluded category

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Figure 5. Party ID of High School Seniors
Lowest Level of Religiosity (Results from multinomial logit)




Figure 6. Party ID of High School Seniors
Mean Religiosity (Results from multinomial logit)




Figure 7. Party ID of High School Seniors
Highest Level of Religiosity (Results from multinomial logit)




Figure 8. Party ID of High School Seniors
Highest Level of Religiosity (Results from multinomial logit)




Figure 9. Party ID of Panel Members (1980 -1989/90)



Table 4. Party ID (1989/90)
Results from multinomial logistic regression

Democrat	
Religiosity	-0.188 (0.041) ***
South	-0.007 (.0158)
Female	0.385 (0.139) ***
Parents' education	-0.012 (0.006) **
Black	3.212 (0.350) ***
Catholic	0.569 (0.151) ***
Constant	0.128 (0.285)
Independent/Other	
Religiosity	-0.208 (0.039) ***
South	-0.486 (0.164) ***
Female	0.254 (0.135) *
Parents' education	-0.0169 (0.006) ***
Black	1.368 (0.410) ***
Catholic	0.266 (0.147) *
Constant	0.850 (0.273) ***
Don't Know	
Religiosity	-0.305 (0.050) ***
South	-0.122 (0.202)
Female	0.580 (0.175) ***
Parents' education	-0.046 (0.008) ***
Black	2.481 (0.394) ***
Catholic	0.455 (0.191) **
Constant	1.040 (0.340) ***
N	1592

Republican is the excluded category

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Figure 10. Party ID of Panel Members
Lowest Level of Religiosity (Results from multinomial logit)




Figure 11. Party ID of Panel Members
Highest Level of Religiosity (Results from multinomial logit)




Table 5. Probability of Switching to Republican Party ID, 1980 – 1989/90
Results from logistic regression

	All respondents (1)	Democrats (2)	Independents/Others (3)	Don't Knows (4)
Religiosity	0.154 (0.038)***	0.071 (0.083)	0.206 (0.062)***	0.333 (0.077)***
South	0.333 (0.143)**	0.471 (0.289)	0.481 (0.258)*	-0.070 (0.285)
Female	-0.178 (0.127)	-0.361 (0.265)	-0.574 (0.217)***	-0.078 (0.246)
Parents' education	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.017 (0.012)	0.014 (0.009)	0.017 (0.010)*
Black	-1.929 (0.363)***	-2.058 (0.555)***	-1.869 (0.791)**	-2.571 (0.637)***
Catholic	-0.138 (0.138)	-0.151 (0.296)	-0.230 (0.236)	-0.579 (0.259)**
Constant	-1.770 (0.260)***	-0.579 (0.521)	-2.022 (0.461)***	-2.334 (0.491)***
N	1592	352	490	409

Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Figure 12. Probability of Switching to Republican Party ID (1980 to 1989/90)

