

# A Muslim by any Other Name? An Experimental Assessment of Religious and Ethnic Identifiers on Support for Political Candidates\*

Kerem Ozan Kalkan <sup>†</sup>, Geoffrey C. Layman <sup>‡</sup> and John C. Green <sup>§</sup>

May 6, 2008

## 1 Introduction

A growing literature documents the impact, or lack thereof, of candidates' socio-demographic characteristics—particularly their gender, race, ethnicity, and religion—of political candidates on vote choice (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Gurin et al. 1989; Kaufmann 2004; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Carsey 1995; Sigelman et al. 1995; Abrajano et al. 2005). These studies concentrate primarily on women and African-American candidates, and they provide mixed findings.

In this paper, we extend the analysis of the electoral importance of candidates' socio-demographic backgrounds by analyzing experimental data on the impact of cues about the ethnic, religious, and cultural background of a hypothetical Muslim and Arab-American candidate. Arab- and Muslim-Americans are an increasingly important group in U.S. politics because of the circumstances surrounding the terrorist

---

\*An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 66th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL., April 2–5, 2008.

<sup>†</sup>Ph.D student at University of Maryland, College Park. E-mail: kkalkan@gvpt.umd.edu

<sup>‡</sup>Associate Professor at University of Maryland, College Park E-mail: glayman@gvpt.umd.edu

<sup>§</sup>Distinguished Professor of Political Science, and Senior Fellow with the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. Email: green@uakron.edu

attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent American "war on terror," the rapidly growing and relatively high-status Muslim population in the U.S. (Pew Report 2007), and the election of the first Muslim member of Congress, Keith Ellison (D-MN), in 2006. The growing salience of Muslims and Arabs in American political life, together with their relative unpopularity in American public opinion may serve to make Muslim religion and Arab ethnicity among political candidates a powerful and, most likely, negative cue for voters. That negative impact should be especially potent for individuals who have antipathy toward cultural "outgroups" more generally. In keeping with the social identity perspective on intergroup relations (Stouffer 1955; Tajfel 1982; Duckitt 1992; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007), we have shown elsewhere that the primary predictor of how individuals feel about Muslims is how they feel about other cultural outgroups-groups such as welfare recipients, illegal immigrants, and gays and lesbians (Kalkan et al. 2008). Thus, the presence of a Muslim or Arab candidate in a race may strongly condition the relationship between general feelings toward cultural minority groups and voting behavior.

Using an original experiment embedded within a national-sample survey conducted in the fall of 2007, we examine the impact of variation in a candidate's name and information about his ethnic background and religious affiliation on the likelihood of voting for him. We also assess the degree to which the impact of cultural outgroup affect on candidate support is conditioned by these ethnic and religious identifiers. We find that the nature of the candidate's name is inconsequential for his appeal to voters, while information about the candidate's Muslim religious affiliation and cues about his Arab ethnic background have very similar effects on his electoral strength. There are virtually no differences in support between respondents who know that the candidate is Muslim, those who know that he was born in an Arab country, and those who know both things. Finally, the impact of feelings about other cultural outgroups

on candidate support is significantly and strongly conditioned by our experimental treatments. However, in line with the basic relationship between the various demographic identifiers and levels of candidate support, the impact of outgroup affect on the likelihood of voting for the candidate does not depend on the type of information provided about his ethnic or religious characteristics, but only between respondents who are told that he is either a Muslim or possesses Arab ethnicity (or both) and those who are not given either cue.

## **2 Stereotypes as Information Heuristics**

One of the most consistent findings in the political behavior literature is the low level of political sophistication among Americans (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Rather than engaging in detailed analyses of elections or candidates, most citizens make political decisions on the basis of information heuristics such as party identification Downs (1957); Conover and Feldman (1982, 1989), incumbent/challenger status in congressional elections (Jacobson 1992; Herrnson 1995), and stereotypes about social groups (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Lau 1986; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Miller et al. 1991a). Voters use these cognitive heuristics as a way to act “rationally” under a low information environment, and one such shortcut is the demographic profile of the candidates in an election (Stokes and Miller 1962; Popkin 1994). Candidate characteristics provide low-cost information based on commonly-accepted social group stereotypes. Through early socialization in family and at school, past experiences, and stored knowledge, “voters can make reasonable assumptions about the ideology of a candidate based on associations with salient political or social groups” (McDermott 1997, 271). Reliance on socio-demographic heuristics is especially likely when candidates are from highly stereotyped minority or politically underrepresented

groups (Hamilton 1981).

Most of the research on the impact of candidates' socio-demographic features has focused on the cases of female or African-American candidates, perhaps because of the history of gender and anti-black discrimination in American life and because gender and race may be the most salient and readily accessible stereotypes for low-information voters. Large numbers of voters use gender-based stereotypes to make inferences about candidates' policy positions, issue attitudes, and personal traits (Sapiro 1983; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Koch 2000; Matland and King 2002; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Dolan 1998). Meanwhile, the electoral impact of candidate race seems to depend on contextual factors like the personal traits, prior record, and campaign style of the candidates (Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990) and the racial composition of the locale (Carsey 1995; Kaufmann 2004). In contrast, some researchers argue that voters, liberal or conservative, are no more or less likely to vote for black or Latino candidates than for Anglo (white) candidates (Sigelman et al. 1995; Sniderman et al. 1991).

Despite the close and growing ties between religion and political behavior in the United States (Layman 2001; Green 2007; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2006), few studies examine the influence of candidate's religion on voting decisions, and those that do focus almost exclusively on Catholic candidates (Converse et al. 1961; McDermott 2007). However, like gender and race, candidate religious affiliation is another readily accessible information heuristic for politically unsophisticated voters (Bolce and De Maio 1999a,b; Campbell et al. 2007). Because certain religious groups are closely associated either with a particular party or with particular policy stands, candidate religion provides "voters with inferential information about candidates' political positions" (McDermott 2007, 955), and a handful of studies have found candidate religion to be consequential for vote choice and for the impact of other orientations on the vote (Converse et al. 1961; McDermott 2007; Wilson 2007; Campbell et al. 2007).

We seek to expand the scope of research on the political consequences of candidates' socio-demographic characteristics to include candidates with Muslim and Arab religious and ethnic backgrounds. Assessing the propensity of Americans to support Muslim and Arab candidates is important for at least two reasons. First, the 2006 election witnessed the election of the first Muslim politician, Congressman Keith Ellison of Minnesota, to national-level office—an event that may portend the emergence of numerous Muslim political candidates given the relatively rapid growth in the Muslim-American population in the U.S. and the relatively high socioeconomic levels of its members. Thus, it is important to understand the effects that Muslim faith may have on candidates' levels of electoral support. Second, Muslims have long been one of the most unpopular ethnic and religious minority groups in the U.S. (Kalkan and Su 2007)<sup>1</sup>, and the September 11 terrorist attacks made Islam much more salient in the eyes of the American public<sup>2</sup>. This combination of negative affect and high salience suggests that Muslim religion and Arab ethnicity may act as very powerful negative heuristics for voters.

Of course, there is also an important ethnic dimension to being Muslim in America. According to the Pew survey (2007) 65 percent of Muslim Americans are foreign born, and 32 percent are from the Middle East (Arab region and Iran). Although 62 percent of Arab Americans are Christians (DAAS 2003), there is likely to be a very close association between Muslim religion and Arab ethnicity in the minds of most Americans<sup>3</sup>. Therefore, in addition to the impact of cues about a candidate's

---

<sup>1</sup> For example, in the 2004 NES, the mean feeling thermometer rating for Muslims was 54.1, as compared to means for Catholics, Jews, blacks, and Latinos of 68.6, 67.6, 72.3, and 67.9, respectively. In our own 2007 survey, the mean rating of Muslims was 43.1, compared to means for Jews, blacks, and Latinos of 67.4, 66.9, and 58.4, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> For example, 56 percent of respondents to a 1993 Los Angeles Times survey said that they had not heard enough about Islam to say whether they viewed it favorably or unfavorably. In a 2005 Pew survey, that was only 27 percent.

<sup>3</sup> Not surprisingly, the correlation between Arab and Muslim feeling thermometer ratings is .8 (by far the highest correlation between all pairs of minority group thermometers in our dataset).

Muslim faith, we also assess the impact of Arab and Middle Eastern ethnic identifiers—the nature of a candidate’s name and information about his original nationality—on the likelihood of supporting him. We examine the extent to which affiliation with Islam, having a Middle Eastern background, and having a Middle Eastern name have unique and joint effects on a candidate’s level of electoral support. We expect that, on average, citizens will be less likely to support a candidate who is Muslim, has immigrated from an Arab country, has a Middle Eastern name, or some combination of those three characteristics than our “baseline” candidate who is associated with valence issues and does not have obvious Muslim, Arab, or Middle Eastern traits. In other words, affiliation with Islam, Arab ethnicity, or being from a Middle Eastern country will stimulate stereotypical reactions from typical Americans and make them less willing to vote for the candidate.

### **3 Attitudes toward Cultural “Outgroups” and Voting for Muslim Candidates**

We contend that that should be particularly true for voters who have negative attitudes toward a range of cultural “outgroups.” A vast body of research documents the important role of group affect and group-based attitudes for citizens’ political attitudes, orientations, and decisions (Berelson et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Sears et al. 1980; Conover and Feldman 1981; Brady and Sniderman 1985; Miller et al. 1991b; Jelen 1993; Bolce and De Maio 1999a; Green et al. 2002), and, as we have mentioned, evaluations and perceptions of the social groups to which candidates belong are quite important for determining attitudes toward and support for them. There is no question that how individuals feel about Muslims and Arabs as groups

should strongly influence their propensities for voting for Muslim- and Arab-American political candidates. However, we argue that support for Muslim- and Arab-American candidates should be shaped not just by evaluations of those specific groups, but by attitudes toward cultural outgroups more broadly. Social identity theory points to the centrality of an “ingroup” bias in how people think about their own identity. People attempt to maintain or enhance their own self-esteem by comparing other social groups-“outgroups”-unfavorably to their own (Struch and Schwartz 1989; Oswald 2005). As Levinson (1949) argues, “outgroups are the objects of negative opinions and hostile attitudes and [they] are regarded as properly subordinate to ingroups.” (20). Thus, this perspective on intergroup relations views prejudice against one minority group as part of a tendency to denigrate outgroups more generally (Stouffer 1955; Adorno et al. 1950). As Tajfel (1982) argues, “One of the principal features of intergroup behavior and attitudes [is] the tendency shown by the members of an ingroup to consider members of outgroups in a relatively uniform manner, as ‘undifferentiated items in a unified social category’” (21) (see also (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Duckitt 1992).

Accordingly, our own research on attitudes toward Muslims and Muslim-Americans shows that the strongest predictor of Muslim affect, both before and after September 11, 2001, is affect toward other minority groups. These groups include ethnic and racial minorities such as African-Americans, Jews, and Hispanic-Americans, but even more closely related to feelings about Muslims are feelings about those “cultural outgroups” that are particularly unpopular in the minds of Americans: welfare recipients, illegal immigrants, gays and lesbians, and feminists. Thus, we expect that the likelihood of voting for our hypothetical candidate when he is identified as being Muslim or ethnically Arab will be strongly shaped by affect toward other cultural outgroups. In other words, there should be a clear interactive relationship between the presence

of one or more of these religious or ethnic identifiers in our candidate description and the impact of evaluations of cultural outgroups on respondents' expressions of support for him.

## 4 Data and Methods

Our analysis is based on a unique experiment, included in surveys constructed by several political scientists at the University of Maryland and the University of Akron and administered online to national samples of 1,000 respondents (each-the combined sample size of the Maryland and Akron surveys is 2,000) by Polimetrix in the fall of 2007. Our experimental survey questions gauge respondents' levels of support for a hypothetical state legislative candidate and assess the impact of information about the candidate's religious background (whether or not he is identified as a Muslim), his ethnicity (whether or not he is identified as having emigrated from an Arab/Middle Eastern country), and his name (whether or not it is Middle Eastern). We randomly place respondents into eight experimental groups, with each group receiving a different combination of the two values of each of these three variables. This allows us to isolate the specific effects of the candidate's Muslim faith, his Middle Eastern ethnicity, and his name-in addition to the various combinations of those factors-on levels of support for him. Our description of the candidates' policy positions is designed to be neutral with regard to partisanship and ideology so that those factors should not influence the likelihood of supporting him. The baseline question which did not identify the candidate as Muslim, as having a Middle Eastern background, or as having a Middle Eastern name, was worded as follows:

We would like to get your opinion about a candidate running for the state legislature in another state. Please read his description, and then tell us what you think

about him.

Michael Choudhary is a successful local businessman. He is forty-one years old, married, and has three children. He has long been active in his community and local politics. In a recent newspaper article, this is what he said when he was asked why he has entered the state legislative race <sup>4</sup>.

”I am running for the state legislature because I want to see good wages, a strong economy, quality schools, and honest government.”

If you lived in this candidate’s district, how likely would you be to vote for him?

We give four response options to the respondent ranging from “not at all likely” to “very likely”. Keeping the candidate’s policy priorities and other biographical information intact, we manipulate his biography for seven treatment groups. In the first treatment group, we modify the candidate’s biography to affiliate him with Islam:

“Michael Choudhary is a successful local businessman and a *Muslim*. He is forty-one years old...”

We measure the impact of Middle Eastern ethnicity by manipulating the nationality of the candidate:

“Michael Choudhary is a successful local businessman. He immigrated to the United States from *the United Arab Emirates* and is a naturalized American citizen. He is forty-one years old...”

In order to see whether having both religion and ethnicity has much more negative effect on the likelihood of voting, the fourth treatment group is asked about the

---

<sup>4</sup> The name “Michael Choudhary” was chosen for the baseline (or Americanized) name condition because “Choudhary” is a relatively common last name among Arab-Americans. This fact is easily seen in Facebook profiles. Thus, the name may plausibly combine being Muslim and having a Middle Eastern background (in order to isolate the impact of these attributes from the impact of the degree to which the candidate’s name is Middle Eastern). In other words, being Muslim and having emigrated from the United Arab Emirates should seem less far-fetched to respondents for “Michael Choudhary” than it should for a more-typically-American name such as “Bob Smith.”

candidate who is a Muslim, and a Middle Eastern immigrant:

“Michael Choudhary is a successful local businessman and a *Muslim*. He immigrated to the United States from *the United Arab Emirates* and is a naturalized American citizen. He is forty-one years old...”

These questions are asked with the same set of manipulations (baseline, only Muslim, only UAE, or both) for a candidate with a Middle Eastern-sounding name, “Yousef Abdollah”. The respondents were randomly assigned to the control and treatment groups so that we do not need to control the model for confounding demographic variables such as gender, race, income, and education<sup>5</sup>.

Since the dependent variable has four categories, ranging from “not at all likely” to “very likely”, we examine the impact of these experimental treatments<sup>6</sup> on the likelihood of non-Muslim whites supporting the candidate using ordered logit. To assess our first hypothesis-that the treatment groups, regardless of the nature of the Muslim or Arab identifier, should be less likely than the control group (for which no information about Muslim faith or Arab ethnicity is provided) to support the candidate-we include dummy variables for all seven treatment groups as independent variables in the model, with the baseline condition serving as the comparison group.

To test the second hypothesis-that the impact of cultural outgroup affect on support for our candidate should be conditioned by the presence of Muslim and Arab identifiers in the candidate description-we first assess the structure of attitudes toward

---

<sup>5</sup> We compared the eight experimental groups on the basis of race, education, gender, income, party identification, and affect toward Muslims, and found no statistically significant differences between them on these factors.

<sup>6</sup> Since the name treatment did not matter (please see tables 2 and 3), we collapsed seven treatments into three for the second model. The first category includes the treatment on religion, the second on ethnicity, and the third on both. The collapsed treatments cover both Anglo and Middle Eastern oriented names. So, respondents who get the Muslim candidate are in the first category; those who get the Middle Eastern candidate in the second category; and those who get the Middle Eastern Muslim candidate in the third category. The comparison category is American name with no religious or ethnic cues.

racial, ethnic, and cultural minorities through a factor analysis of feeling thermometer ratings (ranging from 0 for the most negative evaluations of a group to 100 for the most positive evaluations) of Muslims, Arabs, gays and lesbians, welfare recipients, illegal immigrants, blacks, and Jews. The results, shown in Table 1, confirm our earlier finding that Muslim affect is more closely related to attitudes toward groups distinguished by their behavioral patterns or cultural practices—in other words, cultural outgroups—than to attitudes toward racial and ethnic minorities (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2008). The factor analysis here again shows that, in the minds of non-Muslim white Americans, Muslims and Arabs are part of a “band of others,” with evaluations of them loading strongly on the same factor with ratings of gays and lesbians, welfare recipients, and illegal immigrants, and ratings of blacks and Jews loading more strongly on the second factor<sup>7</sup>. Accordingly, our measure of cultural outgroup affect is the factor score from a factor analysis of ratings of those cultural outgroups other than Muslims and Arabs—namely, gays and lesbians, welfare recipients, and illegal immigrants. We then estimate an ordered logit model of candidate support among non-Muslim whites in which the independent variables are cultural outgroup affect, dummy variables for three types of experimental treatments, and the interaction between outgroup affect and each of these three dummy variables.

## 5 Findings

We present the estimates of our first ordered logit model in Table 2. A first look at the signs of the treatment groups tells us that all treatments yield a lower likelihood of voting for the candidate than the baseline condition. Any change in the biographical information of the candidate, regardless of name, religion, ethnicity, or some com-

---

<sup>7</sup> We use principal-components factor analysis with oblique rotation to retain factors.

combination of these three, decreases the probability of voting for the candidate. The condition which includes the Middle Eastern name manipulation without any further changes gives less precise estimates than other treatments. Substantively, Americans rate Yousef Abdollah less positively than Michael Choudhary, but their opinion is not settled yet. The 95 % confidence interval around the coefficient for "Middle Eastern name, no cue" shows that there is a slight probability that the effect may also be positive when compared with the control group.

Table 2 about here

The other treatments, on the other hand, work both statistically and substantively against the candidate. The question is which treatment has the biggest impact on the likelihood of voting when compared with the control group. The answer to this question is not provided directly by the coefficient estimates because ordered logit models are not linear, and larger coefficients do not necessarily mean larger effects. Thus, the best way to analyze the comparative effects of the independent variables is through predicted probabilities.

We computed the predicted probabilities of being "somewhat likely" and "very likely" to vote for the candidate for all eight groups, and then summed those probabilities to form a summary measure, presented in Figure 1, of the probability of voting for the candidate for each group. Our general conclusion about the impact of the treatments on the dependent variable is verified in the figure. Interestingly, neither Muslim faith nor Arab ethnicity greatly reduce the likelihood of voting for our candidate. However, when compared with the control group, all treatments generate lower predicted probabilities for the electability of the candidate. The predicted probability of being somewhat or very likely to vote for the candidate is above .80 in the baseline condition, and none of the treatment groups reach this level. Generally

speaking, the likelihood of voting for the candidate decreases when he is identified as Muslim or Middle Eastern (ethnically or in name) or as having any combination of these traits.

Figure 1 about here

We see the biggest drop in the predicted probability for the candidate who is Muslim with an American name. The difference in predicted probabilities between the control group and this treatment is .17. Individuals are 20 percent less likely to vote for the candidate who is Muslim when compared to the control group. The same effect is seen at varying degrees in any combination of religion, ethnicity or name, with the exception of the treatment in which the candidate only has a Middle Eastern name (and is not identified as being Muslim or originally from the UAE). Interestingly, but not unexpectedly, the religion and ethnicity treatments do not have distinguishable effects. Regardless of the candidate's name, they generate essentially the same predicted probabilities. It does not matter whether a person is a Muslim, or from the UAE, or both. The predicted probability for all treatments ranges between .69 and .73. "Muslim" and "UAE" recalls the same negative stereotype in the minds of Americans. The candidate who is only Muslim is not more or less likely than the candidate who is only from the UAE to gain electoral support. By the same token, the candidate who is only Muslim or only Middle Eastern is not more likely to be elected than the candidate who is both Muslim and Middle Eastern. The negative effects do not cumulate as they tap into the same underlying negative stereotype - no matter whether Muslim or Middle Eastern.

For a more rigorous assessment of the differences across these groups, we use a likelihood ratio test of the equality of our ordered logit coefficients. Specifically, we examine the conditions under which the effects of the three variables in our experiment-

Muslim religion, Arab ethnicity, and Middle Eastern name-are statistically significant. As can be seen in Table 3, the name treatments do not have a significant effect under any treatment conditions. Bestowing a Middle Eastern name on the candidate does not make individuals any less or more likely to vote for him. The Muslim cue, meanwhile, only dampens the likelihood of voting for the candidate when there is no cue of ethnicity. Its clearest effect is unquestionably in comparison to the baseline condition. Individuals are definitely less likely to vote for a Muslim candidate when the comparison candidate has an American name with no mention of Arab ethnicity. The chi-square statistic does not reach the traditional level of significance for the comparison between support for Yousef Abdolah without any mention of religion or ethnic background and support for candidate Abdollah when he is identified as Muslim. However, it is close enough to suggest that Muslim faith also may reduce support for a candidate with a Middle Eastern name.

Table 3 about here

The effect of the Arab ethnicity cue follows the same pattern. Identifying the candidate as having emigrated from the UAE dampens support for him significantly only when the comparison candidate has either an American or Middle Eastern name, but is not identified as Muslim. Arab ethnicity makes individuals more reluctant to vote for the candidate, but only when they do not already know that he is a Muslim. In short, Arab ethnicity and Muslim faith influence a candidate's prospects for election, but only when the other is not mentioned as part of the candidate's socio-demographic profile. Identifying a candidate as being an Arab and describing him as a Muslim seem to provide very similar cues to voters about the candidate social and political traits. Americans do not appear to distinguish between Arab ethnicity and affiliation with Islam. In other words, when voters know that a candidate is a Muslim, informing him

that he is an Arab immigrant does not have any further influence on their likelihood of supporting him, and when voters know that a candidate is an Arab, providing cues about his Muslim faith does not affect their support for him.

This finding yields strong empirical support for our theoretical expectation in the second model. Belonging to a minority group (Muslim or Arab or both) stimulates an emotional reaction which is part of a syndrome of cultural outgroup affect. Anyone who is not like "us" is subject to general ethnocentric evaluations. We examine the impact of these evaluations on the likelihood of voting under different treatments in an interactive ordered logit model of candidate support among white Americans. The predicted probability of being "very likely" or "not at all likely" to vote for the candidate for the control and treatment groups is presented in Figure 2 and 3, respectively. There are three systematic patterns in these figures. First, the predicted probability of voting for the control group candidate (American name with baseline condition) does not change across any value of cultural outgroup affect. As expected, the mainline candidate does not stimulate an emotional reaction toward outgroups among white Americans, and this leads to a flat line independent of cultural outgroup affect. It does not matter how whites feel about cultural outgroups when the candidate does not belong to any minority group.

Second, treatments, regardless of the nature of the manipulation, generate higher (lower) level of predicted probability of being "very likely" ("not at all likely") to vote. A closer analysis of Figure 2 indicates that the predicted probability of being "very likely" to vote for a Muslim and/or Middle Eastern candidate is almost zero among white Americans who hate cultural outgroups. In contrast, as you become much warmer toward cultural outgroups, the predicted probability of being "not at all likely" to vote is zero. The likelihood of voting for a minority candidate is considerably conditioned by affect toward all cultural outgroups. The warmer the

feelings toward cultural outgroups among whites, the higher the probability of voting for a Muslim and/or Middle Eastern candidate.

Third, even though we do not have confidence intervals around the curves, the predicted probability of voting for any minority candidate follows the same pattern. In other words, the likelihood of voting for a Muslim candidate is not more or less than that of voting for a Middle Eastern candidate. The curves in both figures follow such a similar path that they are not distinguishable from each other. The cultural outgroup affect among whites, as expected, generates the same level of predicted probability of voting across all treatment groups. In sum, we find strong support for our first and second hypothesis in the second model as well.

## **6 Summary**

Past research has made it clear that candidates' socio-demographic characteristics have important effects on citizens' propensities to vote for them. In this paper, we have sought to extend this research in two interrelated ways by analyzing experimental data on the impact of cues about a hypothetical candidate's affiliation with Islam, his Arab ethnic background, and his name, on support for him. First, we examine the impact of Muslim faith and Arab ethnicity on candidate support. Our findings suggest that although having a Middle Eastern name does not dampen voter support for a candidate, being Muslim and being originally from an Arab nation do seem to make voters less enthusiastic about the candidate. However, Arab ethnicity and Muslim faith appear to have virtually the same effect on the candidate's electoral support. They reduce the likelihood of voting for him to roughly the same degree and only affect that likelihood when the other trait is not present. Having an Arab ethnic background does not heighten the negative electoral consequences of being

Muslim, and Muslim faith does not escalate the negative effect of Arab ethnicity. Americans appear to view Arabs and Muslims in very nearly the same vein and to respond to both groups in a similarly negative way.

Second, we argue that this similarity in the likelihood of voting is a sign of a general syndrome explaining attitudes toward outgroups in general. In a fully interactive logit model, we measure the conditioning effect of religious and ethnic cues on the relationship between cultural outgroup affect and the likelihood of voting among white Americans. Positive feelings toward cultural outgroups generate higher support for the Muslim and/or Middle Eastern candidate when compared with the support for the mainline candidate. Among white Americans who are extremely ethnocentric, the predicted probability of voting for the candidate is zero when he is a Muslim or a Middle Easterner. In support for our first finding, ethnic or religious cues generate the same level of support for the candidates across all values of cultural outgroup affect. The predicted probability curves of the treatment groups overlap in both Figures 2 and 3.

## Tables and Figures

Table 1: actor Structure of Affect Toward Outgroups

Variables	Loadings	
	Factor 1	Factor 2
Muslim FT	.84	.08
Arab FT	.80	.07
Gays and Lesbians FT	.70	.01
Welfare Recipients FT	.67	.10
Illegal Immigrants FT	.85	-.16
Blacks FT	.25	.75
Jewish FT	-.10	.94
Eigenvalue (oblique rotation)	3.38	2.02
N	884	

Notes: The factors are retined via principal-component factor method with oblique rotation.

Table 2: Ordered Logit Model of Likelihood of Voting for the Candidate

Treatment Groups	
American Name and Muslim	-0.69*** (0.17)
American Name and Ethnicity (UAE)	-0.43** (0.17)
American Name, Religion, and Ethnicity	-0.43* (0.17)
Middle Eastern Name, no cue	-0.14 (0.17)
Middle Eastern Name and Muslim	-0.42* (0.17)
Middle Eastern Name and Ethnicity (UAE)	-0.49** (0.18)
Middle Eastern Name, Muslim, and Ethnicity	-0.61*** (0.17)
$\tau_1$	-2.68*** (0.14)
$\tau_2$	-1.50*** (0.13)
$\tau_3$	0.91*** (0.12)
$N$	1986
pseudo $R^2$	0.0053

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 3: Test of Muslim, Ethnicity, and Name Effects on Likelihood of Voting for the Candidate

Comparison Pairs	$\chi^2$	p-value
<b>Muslim Effect</b>		
American Name, no cue vs. American Name and Muslim	15.86	.0001
American Name and Ethnicity vs. American Name, Ethnicity, and Muslim	.001	.99
Middle Eastern Name, no cue vs. Middle Eastern Name and Muslim	2.74	.10
Middle Eastern Name, and Ethnicity vs. Middle Eastern Name, Ethnicity, and Muslim	.47	.49
<b>Ethnicity Effect</b>		
American Name, no cue vs. American Name and Ethnicity	6.8	.009
American Name and Muslim vs. American Name, Muslim, and Ethnicity	2.14	.144
Middle Eastern Name, no cue vs. Middle Eastern Name and Ethnicity	3.96	.05
Middle Eastern Name and Muslim vs. Middle Eastern Name, Muslim, and Ethnicity	1.27	.26
<b>Name Effect</b>		
American Name, no cue vs. Middle Eastern Name	.74	.39
American Name and Ethnicity vs. Middle Eastern Name and Ethnicity	2.48	.74
American Name and Muslim vs. Middle Eastern Name and Muslim	.11	.12
American Name, Ethnicity, and Muslim vs. Middle Eastern Name, Ethnicity, and Muslim	1.06	.30

Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Somewhat or Very Likely Voting for the Candidate




Figure 2: The Impact of Cultural Outgroup Affect on Voting for Minority Candidate  
By Treatment Groups (Very Likely)




Figure 3: The Impact of Cultural Outgroup Affect on Voting for Minority Candidate  
By Treatment Groups (Not at all Likely)




Table 4: (Appendix) The Impact of Cultural Outgroup Affect Across Treatment Groups

Only Muslim	-2.68*** (0.66)
Only UAE	-2.11*** (0.61)
Muslim and UAE	-2.70*** (0.62)
Cultural Outgroup Affect	-0.50 (1.01)
Muslim X Cultural Outgroup Affect	4.97*** (1.29)
UAE X Cultural Outgroup Affect	3.80** (1.23)
Muslim and UAE X Cultural Outgroup Affect	4.93*** (1.23)
<i>N</i>	619
pseudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.0664

Standard errors in parentheses. Cultural outgroup affect ranges from 0 to 1

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## References

- Abrajano, Marisa A., Jonathan Nagler, and R. Michael Alvarez. 2005. "Race-Based versus Issue Based Voting: A Natural Experiment: The 2001 City of Los Angeles Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 58: 203–218.
- Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950. "The Authoritarian Personality." .
- Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bolce, Louis, and Gerald De Maio. 1999a. "Religious Outlook, Culture War Politics, and Antipathy Toward Christian Fundamentalists." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63 (1): 29–61.
- Bolce, Louis, and Gerald De Maio. 1999b. "The Anti-Christian Fundamentalist Factor in Contemporary Politics." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63 (4): 508–542.
- Brady, Henry E., and Paul M. Sniderman. 1985. "Attitude Attribution: A Group Basis for Political Reasoning." *The American Political Science Review* 79 (4): 1061–1078.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.
- Campbell, Donald, John C. Green, and John C. Layman. 2007. "Partisan Hearts, Minds, and Souls: Candidate Religion and the Activation of Partisan Voting. Unpublished manuscript."

- Carsey, Thomas M. 1995. "The Contextual Effects of Race on White Voter Behavior: The 1989 New York City Mayoral Election." *The Journal of Politics* 57 (1): 221–228.
- Conover, Pamela J., and Stanley Feldman. 1989. "Candidate Perception in an Ambiguous World: Campaigns, Cues, and Inference Processes." *American Political Science Review* 33 (4): 912–940.
- Conover, Pamela Johnston, and Stanley Feldman. 1981. "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identifications." *American Journal of Political Science* 25: 617–645.
- Conover, Pamela Johnston, and Stanley Feldman. 1982. "Projection and the Perception of Candidates' Issue Positions." *The Western Political Quarterly* 35 (2): 228–244.
- Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, edited by David E. Apter. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Converse, Philip E., Angus Campbell, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1961. "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election." *The American Political Science Review* 55 (2): 269–280.
- Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why it Matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dolan, Kathleen. 1998. "Voting for Women in the 'Year of the Woman'." *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (1): 272–293.

- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Duckitt, John. 1992. *The Social Psychology of Prejudice*. Praeger.
- Fiske, Susan T., and Shelley E. Taylor. 1991. *Social Cognition*. McGraw-Hill.
- Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Green, John C. 2007. *The Faith Factor: How Religion Influences American Elections*. Praeger Publishers.
- Gurin, Patricia, Shirley Hatchett, and James S. Jackson. 1989. *Hope and Independence: Blacks' Response to Electoral and Party Politics*. R. Sage Foundation.
- Hamilton, David L. 1981. *Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup behavior*. L. Erlbaum Associates Hillsdale.
- Herrnson, Paul S. 1995. *Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington*. 4th ed. CQ Press Washington, DC.
- Huckfeldt, Robert R., and Carol W. Kohfeld. 1989. *Race and the Decline of Class in American Politics*. University of Illinois Press.
- Huddy, Leonie, and Nayda Terkildsen. 1993. "The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office." *Political Research Quarterly* 46 (3): 503.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1992. "When Opportunity Knocks No One's Home: The Misallocation of Resources in House Campaigns." *Congress Reconsidered (5th ed)* 999: in Dodd and Oppenheimer, CQ Press.

- Jelen, Ted G. 1993. "The Political Consequences of Religious Group Attitudes." *Journal of Politics* 55 (1): 178–90.
- Kalkan, Kerem Ozan, Geoffrey C. Layman, and Eric M. Uslaner. 2008. "A "Band of Others"? Attitudes toward Muslims in Post-9/11 American Society. Unpublished manuscript."
- Kalkan, Kerem Ozan, and Yu-Sung Su. 2007. "A Change in Attitudes Toward Muslims? A Bayesian Investigation of Pre and Post 9/11 Public Opinion. Unpublished manuscript."
- Kaufmann, Karen M. 2004. *The Urban Voter: Group Conflict and Mayoral Voting Behavior in American Cities*. University of Michigan Press.
- Koch, Jeffrey W. 2000. "Do Citizens Apply Gender Stereotypes to Infer Candidates' Ideological Orientations?" *Journal of Politics* 62 (2): 414–429.
- Lau, Richard R. 1986. "Political Schemata, Candidate Evaluations, and Voting Behavior." In *Political Cognition: The 19th Annual Carnegie Symposium on Cognition*, edited by Richard R. Lau and David O. Sears. Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum.
- Layman, Geoffrey. 2001. *The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Levinson, Daniel J. 1949. "An Approach to the Theory and Measurement of Ethnocentric Ideology." *Journal of Psychology* 28 (1): 19–39.
- Matland, Richard E., and David C. King. 2002. "Women as Candidates in Congressional Elections." In *Women Transforming Congress*, edited by C. S. Rosenthal. University of Oklahoma Press.

- McDermott, Monika L. 1997. "Voting Cues in Low-Information Elections: Candidate Gender as a Social Information Variable in Contemporary United States Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1): 270–283.
- McDermott, Monika L. 2007. "Voting for Catholic Candidates: The Evolution of a Stereotype\*." *Social Science Quarterly* 88 (4): 953–969.
- Miller, Arthur H., Christopher Wlezien, and Ann Hildreth. 1991a. "A Reference Group Theory of Partisan Coalitions." *The Journal of Politics* 53 (4): 1134–1149.
- Miller, Arthur H., Christopher Wlezien, and Anne Hildreth. 1991b. "A Reference Group Theory of Partisan Coalitions." *Journal of Politics* 53: 1134–1149.
- Oswald, Debra L. 2005. "Understanding Anti-Arab Reactions Post-9/11: The Role of Threats, Social Categories, and Personal Ideologies 1." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 35 (9): 1775–1799.
- Popkin, Samuel L. 1994. *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2002. "Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (1): 20–34.
- Sapiro, Virginia. 1983. *The Political Integration of Women*. University of Illinois Press.
- Sears, David O., Richard R. Lau, Tom R. Tyler, and Harris M. Allen Jr. 1980. "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting." *American Political Science Review* 74 (3): 670–684.

- Sigelman, Carol K., Lee Sigelman, Barbara J. Walkosz, and Michael Nitz. 1995. "Black Candidates, White Voters: Understanding Racial Bias in Political Perceptions." *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 243–265.
- Sniderman, Paul, and Louk Hagendoorn. 2007. "When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontent in the Netherlands." .
- Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock. 1991. *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stokes, Donald E., and Warren E. Miller. 1962. "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 26 (4): 531–546.
- Stouffer, Samuel A. 1955. *Communism, conformity, and civil liberties*. Doubleday.
- Struch, Naomi, and Shalom Schwartz. 1989. "Intergroup Aggression: Its Predictors and Distinctness from In-group Bias." *J Pers Soc Psychol* 56 (3): 364–73.
- Tajfel, Henri. 1982. "Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations." *Annual Review of Psychology* 33 (1): 1–39.
- Wald, Kenneth D., and Allison Calhoun-Brown. 2006. *Religion And Politics in the United States*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Wilson, Charles R. 2007. *Southern Missions: The Religion of the American South in Global Perspective*. Baylor University Press.